Of course, even faster is better 😉
A top topic with founders and VCs who have been around since the pre-AI era: is T2D3 dead? Is 100% growth … too low? Do I need to be an AI company?
My simplification, stress-tested against both funds’ portfolios and the last two years of rounds I’ve seen:
You need to go from $1M to $100M ARR in 5 years or less to raise venture capital today. Faster is better.
Two things that rule does not say:
It doesn’t say you have to get to $1M ARR quickly. Early capital is patient. Seed is still priced on team, wedge, and early signal, and taking three years to find the thing is more or less fine.
And it doesn’t say growth is the only thing that matters. Retention, gross margin, and burn all still get diligenced hard. But they get diligenced after the growth rate clears the bar. They don’t substitute for it.
The clock starts at $1M ARR. From there you have five years.
What “$1M to $100M in 5 Years” Actually Requires
100x in five years is 151% growth a year, compounded, five years running.
Now put it next to T2D3, which Neeraj Agrawal coined at Battery a decade ago and which became the canonical venture growth path: triple, triple, double, double, double.

T2D3 is actually ahead through year 3, because tripling beats 151%. Then it falls behind and finishes at $72M, 28% short.
So T2D3 didn’t die. It got demoted. The aspirational path of 2016 is now roughly the minimum, and you have to beat it by a year or start the run at $1.4M instead of $1M.
Work Backward From the IPO and the Number Falls Out
Importantly, the growth bar isn’t realy set by VCs. It’s set by the exit, and every stage prices off it.
Sapphire Ventures’ 2026 Software x AI report puts the current IPO calculus at $400M to $500M+ in revenue, 20%+ growth at scale, positive free cash flow or a credible path to it, and an AI story that holds up. For a strong IPO, where the aftermarket works and the round you raised at is a floor rather than a ceiling, the real number is $500M+ growing 50%+.
Look at what actually cleared it. Figma priced its IPO in July 2025 at $33, valuing it around $19.3 billion, on $749M of 2024 revenue growing 48%, roughly $1B of ARR at listing, 91% gross margins, and Q1 2025 net income of $44.9M. It closed day one near $47 billion.
Then the market repriced it anyway. Figma’s first public quarter came in at 41% growth and the stock fell about 20% the next day. Profitable, $1B of revenue, growing 41%, and public investors took a fifth of the market cap off for the deceleration.
Now run the second ladder. If you hit $100M ARR in year 5 and hold 50% growth from there:

Nine years from $1M to $500M+ ARR still growing 50%. That’s the whole arc, and it only works if you clear the first checkpoint on time. Miss year 5 by two years and you arrive at $500M growing 30%, which is a fine business and a mediocre IPO.
The Multiples Did the Damage, Not the Growth Rates
The revenue bar went up mostly because the multiple went down.
Per Sapphire’s 2026 data, even the fastest growers, 25%+ revenue growth, now trade at 8.3x NTM revenue against a 10-year average of 10.8x. Public enterprise software has lost $2.4 trillion in market cap since the October 2025 peak. The Sapphire Broad Software Index is down 29% from peak and the Pure SaaS Index is down 30%. Unlike every prior 20%+ software drawdown since 2001, this one is not tracking a broader Nasdaq decline, which tells you it’s structural rather than macro.
Do the arithmetic on what that means for the exit. At 10.8x, a $400M-revenue company is worth $4.3B. At 8.3x it’s worth $3.3B. To get back to $4.3B you need $520M of revenue.
Every stage below the IPO reprices off that same number. Series C investors underwriting a $4B exit now need 30% more revenue at the exit than they did against the 10-year average multiple, and they push that requirement down to the B, and the B pushes it to the A.
The Fund Math at the Valuations Founders Are Raising At
Per Carta’s Q1 2026 data, the Series A bar for AI startups is now around $3.5M ARR, roughly 3.5x the ~$1M bar from three years ago, with the median AI Series A at $13M to $15M on a $75M to $250M post. Over 60 cents of every venture dollar Carta tracked in Q1 2026 went to AI companies.
So: a fund buys 15% to 20% at Series A on a nine-figure post. After the B, C, and D, that’s 7% to 10% at exit. For that position to return a real multiple on a $60M fund, the company has to be worth several billion dollars.
At 8x revenue, several billion dollars means $400M to $600M of revenue.
There is no version of this where the company gets there without going from $1M to $100M in about five years. The entry price already spent the optionality. And it binds the seed round too, because seed is underwritten against the same terminal number.
Entrata Filed With $509M of Revenue Growing 24%. It’s a PE Listing.
Entrata filed to go public with $509.3M of 2025 revenue, up from $412.0M, so 24% growth, cash-flow positive, with Q1 2026 revenue of $143.5M against $116.6M a year prior.
Over $500M of revenue, profitable, category leader in multifamily property management software. By any operating standard, an excellent company.
It’s also PE-owned, and it’s leading a wave of PE-owned software listings rather than venture-backed ones, because a buyout fund has a defined life and LPs counting distributions. A venture-backed company compounding at 40%+ can wait, raise privately, or run a continuation vehicle. Most sponsor-owned names can’t.
Meanwhile the venture-backed B2B software window has been effectively shut. As of May 2026 there were zero software listings against 32 total IPOs, and Renaissance Capital expects 200 to 230 IPOs across 2026 with sponsors leading the calendar.
So $500M of ARR by itself doesn’t clear the bar. $500M growing 50% clears it. And if the honest forecast is a $500M business growing 24%, the capital that fits is private equity or growth equity, which is a much cheaper thing to learn at $20M ARR than at $200M.
Cursor Went From $1M to $100M in 12 Months. That’s the Comp Now. It’s Crazy, But It’s an AI-Fueled World.
This bar has teeth in 2026 and didn’t in 2019 because the top of the market moved far enough to drag the reference point with it.
- Cursor went from $1M to $100M ARR in roughly 12 months, then $300M three months later, $500M three months after that, $1B by November 2025 and $2B by February 2026.
- Lovable hit $100M ARR in about eight months with 45 employees, and $400M by February 2026 with 146 people, roughly $2.77M of ARR per employee.
- ElevenLabs went from $100M in January 2025 to $2B by February 2026.
The pattern holds below the outliers too. ICONIQ’s top-quartile companies under $50M ARR grew 111% in the second half of 2025. The median private B2B company grew 22%.
Venture rounds get priced against the first number, not the second. A company doing $8M ARR growing 40% beats the median of every private benchmark published this year and is still a hard venture fundraise. The business can be excellent. It’s the capital pool that doesn’t fit.

Where This Rule Breaks
I’d rather give you the exceptions than have you discover them in a board meeting.
Infrastructure and deeply technical categories get more time. If the product takes three years to build and the contracts are seven figures, sophisticated investors will underwrite a slower ramp to $100M against a much larger terminal number. Databricks and Snowflake did not run this curve.
Consumption businesses report revenue, not ARR, and the shapes differ. A usage-based company can look flat for three quarters and then step-function when one customer moves a workload into production. Applying an ARR rule to a consumption line item produces bad conclusions in both directions.
Retention can buy you a year. $12M ARR growing 55% with 135% NRR and a 12-month CAC payback is a fundable Series B in 2026. $12M growing 55% with 98% NRR is usually not. The growth bar and the retention bar trade against each other at the margin, though not by much and not for long.
The best argument against all of this: the 2021 vintage proved that pricing companies off a five-year 100x curve produces enormous markdowns when the curve breaks, and plenty of good investors think the right response to an 8.3x market is to underwrite slower, cheaper, more durable companies rather than to raise the growth bar. That view might win over the next decade. It just isn’t how most rounds are getting priced right now.
What to Do With This Before Your Next Round
If you’re under $1M ARR: ignore all of it. You have time, and the worst thing you can do is force growth before the wedge is real.
If you just crossed $1M: mark the date. Five years from that date, you need a $100M ARR business, and that means you need to know inside of 18 months whether the motion compounds at 150% or at 60%. Those are different companies with different capital structures, and both can be great.
If you’re at $10M to $30M growing 40% to 60%: you’re running the most common and most painful profile in B2B right now. Above the median, below the venture bar. The move is to pick your capital deliberately rather than spend nine months discovering the mismatch through 40 investor meetings. Growth equity, a strategic minority round, and staying default-alive on your own cash are all real answers.
And if you’re on the 151% curve: raise more than you think you need. Capital is concentrating hard, over 60 cents of every venture dollar went to AI in Q1, and the premium for actually being on the curve is the largest I’ve seen it.
Owner Did It With Restaurants ($1M to $100M in 5 Years), Fueled in Part By Going All-In on AI
How they did it here:
