The Nasdaq hit another all-time high this week. Nvidia’s market cap sailed past $5 trillion. AI companies are scaling revenues at least like nothing we’ve ever seen (if not profits, other than Nvidia). The champagne and fees are flowing for VCs.
But two deals that closed THIS WEEK should give every B2B SaaS founder—and their investors—serious pause about what valuations actually mean in 2025.
The Tale of Two Exits That Tell You Everything About B2B Right Now
Navan, the corporate travel and expense management platform formerly known as TripActions, IPO’d on Thursday at $25 per share. By market close? Down 20% to $20, giving the company a valuation of approximately $4.7 billion.
They’re doing roughly $613 million in trailing twelve-month revenue (up 32% YoY).
That’s a 7.7x revenue multiple at close. Not terrible, right?
Except they raised over $1.4 billion in funding at a peak private valuation of $9.2 billion in 2022. They planned to IPO at $12 billion in early 2023.
The math: If you invested in Navan’s late rounds, you just took a 50%+ haircut on day one of public trading.
JAMF, the Apple device management company, agreed this week to be taken private by Francisco Partners for $2.2 billion.
Their ARR? $710 million.
That’s a 3.1x ARR multiple. Three point one.
A profitable, scaled, public B2B SaaS company with $710M in ARR and 75,000+ customers just got acquired at 3x revenue.
What Actually Happened Here? Let’s Do the Math.
Navan: When “Strong Growth” Isn’t Enough
Navan’s story is actually impressive in so many ways:
- Over 10,000 customers
- $7.6 billion in gross bookings (up 34%)
- 110% net revenue retention for customers they’ve had 1+ years
- Strong international presence (41% of revenue)
- 68% gross margins in a fintech/software hybrid model
- AI handling 50% of customer interactions
These are legitimately strong metrics. In 2020, this would have been a $15B+ IPO.
In 2025? The market said “show me the path to profitability” and knocked 20% off the price on day one.
The brutal reality: Navan lost $38.6 million in Q2 2025 on $172 million in revenue. They’re not profitable yet, and investors are no longer willing to pay premium multiples for “we’ll figure out profitability later.”
The IPO also came with unusual circumstances—Navan was the first company to use a new SEC rule allowing IPOs during the government shutdown. The regulatory uncertainty didn’t help, but let’s be honest: the fundamentals matter more.
At $4.7B valuation on $613M TTM revenue, Navan is trading at 7.7x. That’s actually decent for a growth company in 2025. But it’s a far cry from the 15-20x multiples of 2021.
And here’s the kicker: Navan’s biggest investors—Lightspeed (24.8%), Oren Zeev (18.6%), and Andreessen Horowitz (12.6%)—are sitting on huge gains if they were early enough. But Series F and G investors? They’re underwater. Significantly.
JAMF: The Cautionary Tale of “Good But Not Great”
JAMF’s story is even more sobering because it shows what happens when you can’t maintain growth velocity.
The trajectory:
- IPO’d July 2020 at $26/share with $225M ARR (~10x ARR multiple)
- First day pop to $51, closed at $39.20 ($4.6B market cap)
- Peak November 2021: $48/share
- Francisco acquisition October 2025: $13.05/share ($2.2B)
Let that sink in. The company is being acquired for LESS THAN HALF its day-one IPO valuation. And 83% below its peak.
But here’s what makes it fascinating: JAMF actually TRIPLED their ARR from $225M to $710M over those five years. Revenue grew from $204M in 2019 to $666M TTM—a 27% CAGR.
So how does a company triple its revenue and see its valuation cut in half?
Simple: Growth rate deceleration killed them.
- 2019: 39% YoY growth
- Q1 2020 (IPO): 37% YoY growth
- 2024: 12% growth
- 2025 projection: 10-11% growth
They went from 35-40% growth to 10-15% growth. And they never figured out operating leverage.
The Rule of 40? At IPO in Q1 2020, JAMF’s Rule of 40 was 36%—not great, but acceptable.
Today? Negative 1%. That’s 11% growth minus 12% GAAP operating margin loss.
They executed TWO rounds of layoffs in two years (6% in January 2024, another 6.4% in July 2025). You don’t cut 12% of your workforce over 18 months if your unit economics are working.
The bright spot? Security ARR hit $203 million (up 40% YoY), now 29% of total ARR. That’s real product expansion.
But it wasn’t enough. The core business decelerated, they couldn’t achieve operating leverage, and the market re-rated them. Harshly.
The Uncomfortable Math That VCs Don’t Want to Talk About
When I see deals like these, I think about all those late-stage rounds from 2020-2022. The ones at 20x, 30x, even 50x ARR multiples.
Here’s the math that doesn’t work anymore:
If you invested in Navan’s Series G at the $9.2B valuation peak:
- Current market value: $4.7B (down 49%)
- With standard liquidation preferences, you’re getting maybe 0.5x your money back
- That’s not a venture return. That’s capital destruction.
If you’re a late-stage investor in ANY B2B company that raised at 20x+ ARR between 2020-2022:
- Public market comparables trade at 5-7x ARR (median)
- Exceptional companies (ServiceNow, Snowflake) might get 10-15x
- Your 20x valuation needs the company to 3-4x revenue just to break even
- How many companies actually do that? Maybe 10-20%.
What the Public Markets Are Actually Telling Us
The public markets have been SCREAMING at private company valuations for two years. But somehow, many private investors are still pretending 2021 is coming back.
It’s not.
JAMF at 3.1x ARR is particularly instructive. This is a company with:
- $710M in ARR
- 75,000+ customers globally
- #1 position in Apple device management
- Profitable on a non-GAAP basis
- 20+ years of operating history
And they got 3x revenue. Three.
If that’s what a scaled, profitable, market-leading B2B company fetches in today’s market, what does that tell you about private company valuations?
The median public SaaS company trades at 7x revenue. Private B2B companies? Bootstrapped average 4.8x, venture-backed average 5.3x (according to recent data).
So when you see a private company raising at 15x, 20x, 30x ARR, ask yourself: What has to go RIGHT for that valuation to make sense?
The answer is usually: Everything. All at once. Forever.
Why Growth Rate Is Everything (And Why JAMF Is the Perfect Example)
Here’s what kills me about JAMF: They did almost everything right.
- Dominated a niche
- Scaled to $700M+ ARR
- Expanded into security (40% growth)
- Served 75,000 customers
- Generated positive cash flow
But they couldn’t maintain 30%+ growth at scale. And in SaaS, the market doesn’t care about absolute revenue growth—they care about growth RATE.
A company growing $100M at 40% is worth more than a company growing $300M at 12%.
The math is brutal but real. This is why:
At 40% growth, you 2x in ~2 years, 4x in ~4 years. At 12% growth, you 2x in 6 years, 4x in 12 years.
Investors will pay 10-15x for the first scenario. They’ll pay 3-5x for the second.
JAMF’s problem wasn’t that they were failing. They were succeeding—just not fast enough.
And in public markets, “good but not great” gets brutalized.
The Operating Leverage Problem That Nobody Wants to Admit
Both Navan and JAMF share a common challenge: They haven’t figured out how to make the business more profitable as it scales.
Navan: Still losing money at $600M+ revenue run rate. Burns cash. Can’t articulate a clear path to profitability that satisfies public market investors.
JAMF:
- GAAP operating loss of $68.46M in 2024 on $627M revenue
- Non-GAAP operating income of $33.5M in Q2 2025 (19% margin)
- But the $48M/quarter gap between GAAP and non-GAAP is real stock comp and real dilution
This is the dirty secret of many SaaS companies: As you scale, margins should expand. Sales efficiency should improve. G&A as a percentage of revenue should decline.
If you’re at $700M ARR and still not profitable on a GAAP basis, something is structurally wrong.
Either your CAC is too high, your gross margins are too low, or you’re spending on things that don’t drive growth.
JAMF never solved this. That’s why they’re going private—Francisco Partners thinks they can fix the margin structure outside the scrutiny of quarterly earnings.
Maybe they can. But public investors already made their judgment.
What This Means for Every B2B Founder Reading This
If you’re running a B2B SaaS company right now, these two deals should be your wake-up call:
1. Your Last Round Price Might Be Meaningless
If you raised at 20x ARR in 2021, that doesn’t mean you’re worth 20x today. It might mean you have a serious down-round problem coming.
The market has repriced risk. Accept it and plan accordingly.
2. Growth Rate > Absolute Scale
Navan has impressive scale. JAMF has impressive scale. Neither matters if growth is decelerating.
You need to maintain 25-40% growth at scale to command premium multiples. Below 20%? You’re getting 3-7x ARR regardless of how big you are.
3. The Path to Profitability Is Not Optional Anymore
“We’ll figure out profitability after we scale” doesn’t work in 2025. Investors want to see:
- Improving gross margins
- Operating leverage (OpEx growing slower than revenue)
- A credible plan to GAAP profitability within 12-24 months
If you can’t show that, expect a haircut. A big one.
4. IPO Windows Are Real But Narrow
Navan is going public because they have to. At $600M+ revenue, they’re too big for most strategic buyers, but not exciting enough for a blockbuster IPO in this market.
They’re in no-man’s land. The IPO at a lower valuation might be better than the alternatives (staying private and running out of options, or a fire-sale M&A).
But it’s not the outcome anyone wanted.
5. Being #1 in Your Category Isn’t Enough
JAMF is the undisputed leader in Apple device management. It doesn’t matter.
Why? Because their TAM is capped by Apple’s enterprise penetration, and they’re fighting Microsoft’s bundling strategy.
If your TAM isn’t expanding and you can’t grow 30%+, even category leadership won’t save you.
You need to expand TAM, add products, move upmarket, go international—SOMETHING to reignite growth.
The Hardest Truth: Many Late-Stage Rounds Are Underwater
Here’s what nobody in venture wants to say out loud, but everyone knows:
Most B2B SaaS companies that raised large rounds at 15x+ ARR between 2020-2022 will never grow into those valuations.
Not because they’re bad companies. Not because the founders aren’t talented. But because the math simply doesn’t work when multiples compress from 20x to 5x.
Let’s play this out:
You raised $100M at $1B valuation on $50M ARR (20x multiple) in 2021.
To justify that $1B valuation in 2025, you need to either:
- Get to $200M ARR at 5x (that’s 4x revenue growth), OR
- Get to $100M ARR at 10x (requires being exceptional + profitable), OR
- Hope multiples go back to 2021 levels (they won’t)
How many companies pull off 4x revenue growth from $50M to $200M? Maybe 20% in a good environment. Maybe 10% in this environment.
Which means 80-90% of these late-stage rounds are structurally impaired.
The LPs will figure this out in 2026-2027 when funds can’t hide behind marks anymore.
And that’s going to be ugly.
Why JAMF Going Private Might Actually Be the Right Outcome
Here’s something contrarian: JAMF’s exit to Francisco Partners might be the best outcome for everyone involved.
Yes, it’s below the IPO price. Yes, it’s “only” 3.1x ARR. But consider:
- Shareholders get liquidity NOW
- Francisco has deep expertise in enterprise software and operational improvements
- JAMF can invest for the long term without quarterly earnings pressure
- Employees keep their jobs and might make more money under better management
- Vista exits cleanly after a good (if not spectacular) return
Compare that to staying public, grinding out 10-15% growth, fighting activist investors, and watching your stock languish for years.
Sometimes a 3x exit with certainty beats a 6x maybe-someday-if-everything-goes-perfectly exit.
There’s real wisdom in knowing when to take the money.
What Happens Over the Next 12-24 Months?
Based on Navan and JAMF, here’s what I think we’re going to see:
More down-round IPOs. Companies that have no choice but to go public will accept valuations 30-50% below their last private round. It’s either that or stay private forever.
More take-privates. Solid but unexciting public SaaS companies trading at 3-5x ARR will get bought by PE firms who think they can improve margins and operations.
More M&A at 3-5x multiples. Strategic buyers aren’t paying 10x anymore unless you’re truly exceptional. The new normal is 3-5x ARR for most companies.
More fire sales. Companies that can’t raise another round and can’t IPO will sell for 1-3x ARR to whoever will buy them. Some will just shut down.
The companies that will thrive are the ones that:
- Have real revenue ($50M+ ARR minimum)
- Show real growth (25%+ ideally, 20%+ minimum)
- Have a credible path to profitability (within 12-24 months)
- Didn’t over-raise at insane valuations
- Have founders who understand the market has changed
The Bottom Line: Times Are Good, But B2B Is Hard
Yes, the Nasdaq is at an all-time high. Yes, Nvidia is worth $5 trillion. Yes, AI companies are raising billions.
But B2B SaaS—the bread and butter of venture capital for 15 years—is a different game now.
Navan at 7.7x (after a 20% haircut on day one) tells you that even strong companies with solid metrics aren’t getting premium multiples anymore.
JAMF at 3.1x tells you that profitable, scaled businesses are being valued like mature, slow-growth assets—not growth companies.
If you’re a founder who raised at 20x+ ARR in the last few years, you have two choices:
- Grow into that valuation (really, really hard—you need to 3-4x revenue while maintaining 30%+ growth)
- Accept reality (take a down round, restructure the cap table, or find a creative exit)
If you’re an investor sitting on a portfolio of companies marked at 15-20x ARR, you might want to start having uncomfortable conversations with your LPs about what these assets are actually worth in a 3-7x ARR world.
The good news? If you have a real company with real revenue, real growth, and real unit economics, there’s absolutely still a path forward.
It might not be the path you imagined in 2021 when investors were throwing money at 50x ARR valuations.
But it’s a path. A real one. With real outcomes.
You just need to be honest about what your company is worth, ruthlessly focus on the metrics that matter (growth rate, operating leverage, cash efficiency), and accept that “good” isn’t good enough anymore.
You need to be great. Or you need to be realistic.
Because the market is telling us very clearly: B2B SaaS isn’t magic anymore. It’s just business. And business has to make sense.
The days of “growth at any cost” are over. The days of “we’ll figure out profitability later” are over. The days of 20x ARR valuations for 20% growth companies are over.
Welcome to 2025. Where even hitting $700M ARR doesn’t guarantee a premium multiple. Where even going public doesn’t mean you won.
It’s a harder game. But for the companies that play it well? The returns are still there.
They’re just going to companies that deserve them.
