The IPO window is open again — kind of. IPOs are back, but even Figma is down from its IPO price.
And two very different companies just walked through it with two very different outcomes.
- Wealthfront (WLTH) priced at the top of its range in December 2025 at $14/share, raising $485 million. Six weeks later, the stock is trading around $10—down roughly 30% from its IPO price.
- EquipmentShare (EQPT) priced at the midpoint of its range on January 23, 2026 at $24.50/share, raising $747 million. Five days later, it’s trading at ~$33—up 33% from IPO.
Same market. Same window. Radically different investor reception.
Let’s break down what’s happening here—and what it tells us about what actually matters when you go public.
The Tale of the Tape
| Metric | Wealthfront (WLTH) | EquipmentShare (EQPT) |
|---|---|---|
| IPO Date | December 12, 2025 | January 23, 2026 |
| IPO Price | $14.00 | $24.50 |
| Current Price | ~$10 | ~$33 |
| First Day Pop | +1% | +33% |
| Amount Raised | $485M | $747M |
| IPO Valuation | ~$2.6B | ~$6.2B |
| Current Market Cap | ~$1.5B | ~$8.2B |
| TTM Revenue | $339M | $4.4B |
| Revenue Growth | 26% YoY | 27% YoY |
| Profitability | $123M net income | $2.4M net income (2024); $(25M) TTM loss |
| Founded | 2008 | 2015 |
5 Lessons from These Two IPOs
1. Profitability Context Matters More Than a Binary “Profitable vs. Not”
Being profitable is important, yes. But that alone is not magical. This is the nuanced one.
Wealthfront is solidly profitable. $123 million in net income on $339 million in revenue. That’s a 36% net margin. In fintech. That’s remarkable.
EquipmentShare has a more complicated story. They were profitable in 2022 ($49.6M), 2023 ($17.4M), and 2024 ($2.4M). But aggressive expansion and rising interest costs pushed them to a $25M net loss in the first nine months of 2025. However, they still posted $117.9M in operating profit and $423M in EBITDA during that period.
And yet: EquipmentShare popped 33% on day one. Wealthfront opened flat and has been sliding ever since.
The lesson: Investors aren’t just asking “are you profitable?” They’re asking “can you be profitable when you choose to be?” and “what’s the durability of your growth engine?” EquipmentShare has demonstrated profitability in the past and is showing strong operating metrics even during expansion. That’s different from “has never been profitable.”
2. Revenue Scale Matters
Wealthfront’s $339M in revenue puts them in a respectable spot. But EquipmentShare’s $4.4B in revenue makes them a very different animal.
At $4.4B, EquipmentShare is already one of the largest equipment rental providers in the U.S. They’re not hoping to become a market leader—they are one. Over 90% of the Top 50 general contractors already rent from them.
At $339M, Wealthfront has achieved escape velocity in terms of operating leverage (they estimate you need $250-300M before fixed costs become a rounding error), but they’re still fighting for share in a market where Schwab, Fidelity, and Vanguard have robo-advisors too.
The lesson: There’s a meaningful valuation premium for companies that have already won their category versus those still fighting for it. Scale creates optionality. EquipmentShare can expand into new verticals, raise prices, or coast on market growth. Wealthfront needs to keep climbing.
3. The Interest Rate Dependency Problem
Here’s where Wealthfront’s model gets tricky.
About 75% of Wealthfront’s revenue now comes from cash management—essentially the spread they earn on customer deposits. In a high-rate environment, this is a cash cow. In a falling-rate environment? The math gets harder.
As SaaStr noted in their analysis: “They’re becoming more dependent on interest income even as rates are expected to fall.”
Advisory fees (the predictable, scalable part of the business) only grew 10% YoY. The bulk of their growth came from interest income on cash accounts.
Compare this to EquipmentShare. Their revenue is tied to construction activity and equipment rental demand—cyclical, yes, but not dependent on a single macroeconomic variable that’s actively working against them.
The lesson: Revenue quality matters as much as revenue quantity. The market is increasingly sophisticated about disaggregating growth. Not all dollars are created equal. AUM fees > float income in terms of durability.
4. Founder Control Signals Conviction
Both companies went public with dual-class structures that give founders substantial control.
The Schlacks brothers at EquipmentShare retain ~81% voting power through their Class B shares. That’s a strong signal that the founders see significant upside ahead and want to maintain control of the company’s direction.
Wealthfront has a more distributed ownership structure post-IPO, with early VC backers like Tiger Global, Index Ventures, and Ribbit Capital taking liquidity.
The lesson: Investors read founder selling vs. holding as a signal. When founders maintain super-voting control and stay fully invested, it’s a vote of confidence in the road ahead.
5. The “Tech Company Inside a Traditional Industry” Premium
This is perhaps the most important lesson.
EquipmentShare is, on the surface, an equipment rental company. Excavators. Bulldozers. Compressors. Not exactly sexy.
But the way they talk about themselves—and the way investors are receiving them—is as a technology company that happens to operate in equipment rental.
Their T3 platform provides real-time tracking, predictive maintenance, and remote access control across 235,000+ pieces of equipment. Every unit is connected. Every unit is generating data. It’s the “iOS for construction equipment.”
This narrative matters. United Rentals trades at ~3.3x revenue. EquipmentShare IPO’d at ~1.5x revenue but has quickly traded up toward 2x. If they can convince the market they’re a software-enabled platform play rather than a traditional rental company, that multiple has room to expand.
Wealthfront, ironically, is the opposite story. They’re clearly a tech company. Software-first. Digital-native. But they’re being valued like a financial services company because their revenue is primarily float-dependent. The fintech premium has evaporated.
The lesson: The “tech company inside traditional industry” narrative still commands a premium—if you can back it up with differentiated technology and unit economics. But “fintech” as a category has lost its luster after years of unfulfilled promises.
The Deeper Question: What Kind of Business Are You Building?
Beyond the numbers, these two IPOs represent two different philosophies of company building.
Wealthfront is the disciplined, efficient operator. They’ve achieved profitability at scale. They’ve kept headcount lean (around 500 employees managing $90B+ in AUM). They’ve built a business model where every incremental dollar of AUM costs virtually nothing to service.
The problem? Their model is now working against macro trends. Falling rates will compress their largest revenue stream. And they’re competing against incumbents with deeper pockets and broader product suites.
EquipmentShare is the aggressive, land-grab operator. They’ve grown from $200M to $4.4B in revenue in just six years. They’ve expanded from 1 location to 373 locations in 45 states. And here’s what’s important: they were actually profitablefrom 2022-2024 ($49.6M → $17.4M → $2.4M net income), but the combination of aggressive expansion and rising interest expenses pushed them into a $25M loss in the first nine months of 2025. They also posted $117.9M in operating profit and $423M in EBITDA during that same period.
The bet? That market share at scale will eventually convert to durable competitive advantage. That their T3 platform creates switching costs. That contractors who adopt their technology won’t easily switch to competitors. And critically—that they’ve already proven they can be profitable when they want to be.
Both strategies can work. But only one is being rewarded by the market right now.
What This Means for Your Company
If you’re thinking about an IPO in the next 12-24 months, here’s what these two data points tell you:
- Profitability track record matters more than current quarter P&L—EquipmentShare showed they can be profitable (and were for 3 years), even if they’re investing heavily now. That’s different from “has never been profitable.”
- Narrative matters as much as numbers. Are you a tech company inside a traditional industry (premium multiple), or are you a traditional industry company that uses technology (discount multiple)?
- Revenue quality gets scrutinized. If your growth is dependent on macro tailwinds, investors will discount it. Recurring, sticky, customer-driven revenue > one-time or macro-dependent revenue.
- Founder conviction signals. If you’re going to sell, sell before the IPO. At IPO, stay invested. The market reads founder selling as a lack of confidence.
- Timing isn’t everything, but it’s something. Wealthfront IPO’d on a day the broader market sold off. EquipmentShare IPO’d into a hot market with record highs on the Dow and S&P. Same month. Very different outcomes.
It’s Not Necessarily Easy Out There
Two companies. Similar growth rates (albeit at different scale). Different market receptions.
- Wealthfront built a profitable, efficient, digitally-native wealth management platform. The market valued it at ~6x revenue and then marked it down 30%.
- EquipmentShare built a fast-growing, technology-enabled equipment rental platform with a track record of profitability (2022-2024) that’s currently investing heavily in expansion. The market valued it at ~1.5x revenue and then marked it up 33%.
The difference isn’t about which company is “better.” It’s about which company’s story resonates with where investors want to put capital right now.
And right now? Investors want growth at scale with technology moats in traditional industries. They’re skeptical of fintech narratives tied to interest rates. They’re rewarding market leaders over emerging players.
Both companies will have their chance to prove the market right or wrong over the next few years. But day one tells you a lot about what the market is hungry for.
Build accordingly.
Related: 5 Interesting Learnings from Wealthfront at $340M in “ARR”
