Julian Lehr asked a good question the other day on X: what if Slack had never sold to Salesforce, stayed in founder mode, and went hard at AI? What would the product look like, and what would it be trading at?
Two answers. It would almost certainly still be one product with an ecosystem bolted on. And it would trade like Atlassian at a discount, which puts it around $16B to $20B. Salesforce paid $27.7B.
It May Still Mainly Be One Product, And That’s Most Of The Discount
Atlassian is arguably the closest comp to Slack.
Atlassian’s Teamwork Collection, which bundles Jira, Confluence, Loom and Rovo, crossed 1 million seats and 1,000 customers. Collection customers buy 10%+ more seats than they were buying across the same products standalone. Teamwork customers carry four to five times more paid seats per instance than standalone Jira or Confluence customers. Rovo is used by more than 80% of the Fortune 500, and Rovo adopters grow ARR at roughly twice the rate of non-adopters. Cross-sell, not data center migration, drove the last two cloud beats.
That is a multiproduct company whose bundle expands spend. Customers consolidate onto the platform and pay more for the privilege.
Slack is one product. And the evidence says an independent Slack stays one product, because that was the deliberate strategy. Butterfield built the app directory, now over 2,600 integrations, as the moat. Slack was the hub and everybody else built the spokes. The economic consequence is that Slack’s expansion revenue went to Zoom, Notion, Asana and Google rather than to Slack.
Salesforce had every incentive and all the capital to change that, and it mostly didn’t. Canvas shipped free on every tier, including the free one. Lists shipped inside existing plans. The one time Slack tried a genuine second SKU, Slack AI at $10 per user per month in 2024, it pulled the add-on about fifteen months later and folded AI back into per-seat tiers gated by plan level. Slackbot today runs on an allowance of 15 messages per user per week inside Business+.
Atlassian’s bundle raises seats and ARPU. Slack’s bundling gives the new product away to defend the seat it already has. The multiple reflects that.
Salesforce Disclosed Slack’s Revenue Twice, Then Stopped
Everyone quotes the $3 billion number. It’s a forecast.
The quote comes from Mad Money, around the March 31, 2026 Slack relaunch keynote: “we’ve also tripled revenue during that five year period. We’re anticipating about $3 billion in revenue this year with Slack.” Salesforce’s FY26 closed January 31, 2026, two months before he said that. “This year” is FY27, ending January 2027. It is a target.
What Salesforce has actually put in writing is two numbers, both early:
- FY22: $584 million. Salesforce footnoted its own service-offering table with it. Full-year revenue grew 25%, “or up 22% when excluding $584 million in revenue from Slack.” That covers six months of ownership, net of purchase accounting.
- FY23: approximately $1.5 billion, guided at Q1 FY23 and reiterated at Q2, also net of purchase accounting.
After that it goes dark. Slack was folded into “Platform and Other” and never quantified again. FY24 and FY25 have no Slack figure at all.
So FY26 has to be triangulated, and two independent methods land in the same place. The $1.5B FY23 anchor compounding at roughly 19% for three years gives $2.5B, and $3.0B for FY27 then matches the target exactly. Separately, “tripled” against Slack’s last independent year of $902.6M gives $2.7B.
Call FY26 $2.4B to $2.6B, a 22-23% compound annual growth rate from the $902.6M base, held for five years while Microsoft gave Teams away free inside E3 and E5.
Two more items from the filings. Effective Q2 FY27, Salesforce moved Slackbot revenue into Agentforce ARR, so the $1.5B Agentforce number is now partly a Slack number. And the Agentforce Apps bucket Slack sits in grew 8% year over year in constant currency last quarter. Against that, the best Slack line Salesforce has published: “Slack delivered its fastest quarterly Net New Annual Order Value growth since acquisition as Slackbot users grew over 150% Q/Q.” That is net-new bookings growth, which can look spectacular off a small base while revenue grows 8%.
Salesforce Auto-Provisions Slack Into 150,000 Customers. A Standalone Can’t.
The instinct is that founder mode beats corporate ownership, so an independent Slack would have beaten 22%. Look at what is driving Slack’s growth right now: bundling into Salesforce’s 150,000 customers, auto-provisioning into every new Salesforce customer starting this summer, Agentforce pulling Slack in as the agent interface, and Meta announcing it is moving internal comms onto Slack.
A standalone $1.5B collaboration company gets none of that. What it gets is the Asana and monday.com experience: a broken stock, a shrinking multiple, a 20% RIF, and free Teams inside every Microsoft enterprise agreement.
So call the base case flat. Independent Slack grew at roughly 22% too and is running at something like $2.8B in ARR today.
monday.com And GitLab Both Grow 20%. GitLab Trades At 3x The Multiple.
The comp set as of this week:
Growth is still king. Datadog grows 30% and gets 18x; Asana grows 9.5% and gets 1.7x. Nobody is confused about those two.
Growth is still king. Datadog grows 30% and gets 18x; Asana grows 9.5% and gets 1.7x. Nobody is confused about those two.The middle is where it breaks down a bit, because quality of revenue matters. monday.com grows 19-20% and trades at 2.1x. GitLab grows 21% and trades at 6.2x. Same growth rate, three times the multiple. HubSpot grows 18% and gets a lower multiple than Twilio at 13%.
Margin doesn’t sort it either. GitLab runs a 14% non-GAAP operating margin at 21% growth and gets 6.2x. HubSpot runs 21% margins at 18% growth and gets 3.0x.
Two things sort it. What kind of revenue it is, and whether the forward book is running ahead of the P&L.
On revenue type, the split is metered versus per-seat. Datadog’s net revenue retention is in the low 120s and it is pure usage, so nobody adds a seat and the bill rises anyway. GitLab is at 117% NRR, Figma at 136% net dollar retention. monday.com, HubSpot and Asana are per-seat businesses whose expansion requires their customers to hire.
On the forward book, every premium name in this table has RPO growing faster than revenue. Atlassian’s RPO grew 37%, above 40% normalized for timing, against 26% revenue growth. Datadog’s RPO is up 43% against 36%. GitLab printed net ARR growth above 40% against 21% revenue growth. Okta’s RPO is up 17% and cRPO 14% against 11% revenue growth. The market is pricing the backlog.
Underneath both sits the AI question. Do agents route through you and expand the bill, or route around you and shrink the seat count.
Todd McKinnon on Okta’s Q2 call: “As AI agents transform every layer of technology, every agent needs a trusted identity and clear controls over what it can access and do.” Okta’s cRPO growth accelerated from 12% to 14%, and the stock jumped 19.4% on the print.
Okta is also a warning about how fast these multiples move. In the quarter ended July 31, Okta repurchased 1.54 million of its own shares at an average cost basis of $81.06. The stock is around $170 now. At $81 the same business traded near 3.7x on the same $3.22B revenue guide and the same 11% growth. Nothing operational changed. The market changed its mind about what Okta is for.
Meanwhile monday.com cut 20% of headcount and guided Q3 to 16-17%. HubSpot is down 38% year to date at 18% growth. Asana is at 9.5%. All three are priced as businesses whose unit of value is a human seat, in a year when companies are buying fewer human seats.
Slack Prices Closest To Atlassian, At A Discount
Run roughly $2.8B in ARR through the brackets.
- $5B-$6B if it gets read as per-seat chat. That’s the monday.com and Asana bracket, and I’d treat it as tail risk. Slack holds roughly 13% of enterprise messaging against Teams at 37%, and leaving Slack takes a culture fight while leaving Jira takes an engineering project. Meta just did the reverse and it was news.
- $16B-$20B priced as a platform layer, alongside Atlassian at 7.2x and GitLab at 6.2x. This is the answer. Slack is the same species as Atlassian: bottom-up adoption, an ecosystem on top, a marketplace, presence in nearly 80% of the Fortune 100, and the Connect graph across 100,000 organizations.
- Atlassian’s 7.2x is the top of that band, and the product surface is why. On growth the two are level: both decelerating into the high teens, with Atlassian guiding 18% subscription ARR growth for FY27 against Slack’s implied 19%. What separates them is that Atlassian sells five products that pull each other along, and Slack sells one that it defends by giving things away.
- $22B-$24B priced like Okta, as the control plane every agent transits. Benioff argues exactly this, and points out that OpenAI and Anthropic run their own operations on Slack. Given Okta was itself at 3.7x this summer, treat this as a ceiling.
- $48B-$52B priced like Datadog, which trades near 18x forward on 30% growth with net revenue retention in the low 120s, all of it usage-driven. Nobody adds a seat; the bill rises because customers shipped more code. Its AI-native cohort is over 750 customers including all of the top 10 AI leaders, and MCP tool calls quadrupled sequentially last quarter.
The Datadog case is a stretch, for structural reasons. Slack spent its entire independent life doing the opposite of metering: per-seat pricing, unlimited messages, and a fair-billing policy that credits customers for inactive users. Expansion required adding humans or upgrading tiers, both of which need a renewal conversation. Salesforce is now metering the agent layer, 3.2 billion Agentic Work Units in Q2, up 97% sequentially, and that is a real consumption meter. But it launched five months ago. Moving the multiple would need metered revenue at maybe a quarter of the base growing triple digits, a five-year build an independent Slack would have had to start in 2022, at $1.5B in revenue, against free Teams, with a stock in the Asana bracket. Possible. I wouldn’t underwrite it.
Slack Shareholders Got Out At The Top And Made 2%
Slack holders received $26.79 in cash plus 0.0776 shares of Salesforce per share, worth $45.86 at announcement against an unaffected price of $29.58. A 55% premium at 30.7x trailing revenue.
Salesforce closed at $245.75 the day before the deal. It closed at $258.11 on September 1, 2026.
A Slack shareholder who held the stock and left the cash in a drawer has $46.82 today against $45.86 in December 2020. Up 2% in five years and nine months.
They sold at the top of the collaboration software cycle, at a multiple that no longer exists anywhere in public B2B, and still didn’t compound, because half the consideration was paper in a company that also de-rated hard before recovering this year.
Datadog Grows Four Points Faster Than Atlassian And Trades At 2.5x The Multiple
Salesforce paid $27.7B. The standalone is worth $16B to $20B. Butterfield sold the top of a category and the category never got its multiple back.
The useful part is the distance between Atlassian at 7.2x and Datadog at 18x. Datadog grows 30%, Atlassian 26%. Four points of growth do not explain a 2.5x gap. Revenue type explains it. Datadog’s bill rises when machines do more work, at 120%+ retention, with no renewal conversation. Atlassian’s rises when companies hire more people. In 2026 those two curves point in opposite directions.
Slack sits on the Atlassian side of that line, with one product against Atlassian’s five, and every seat-priced B2B company sits there with it. Two routes across. Sell more products into the same seat, which is what Atlassian’s Collections are doing at a 10% seat lift. Or meter consumption with retention to match, which reprices the whole business.
Okta got most of the way there on narrative alone, going from under 4x to over 8x in a few months with its growth rate unchanged. That works until a quarter comes in light.
Slack’s valuation, independent or not, rides on which side of that line it lands on.
The Path Not Taken: Figma Grew Nearly 4x And Is Still Worth Less Than Adobe Offered
Everything above about Slack is a counterfactual. Figma ran the same experiment for real.
On September 15, 2022, Adobe agreed to buy Figma for approximately $20 billion, roughly half cash and half stock, with a $1 billion reverse termination fee if regulators blocked it. Figma was at about $400 million in ARR, with 150% net dollar retention, growing 100% year over year. Adobe paid 50 times ARR. Shantanu Narayen called it “one of those rare companies that has achieved escape velocity.”
The European Commission and the UK Competition and Markets Authority killed it. The two companies terminated on December 17, 2023, and Adobe wired the $1 billion within three business days. Figma had raised $333 million across its entire history, so the breakup fee came to roughly three times all the capital the company had ever taken.
Then Figma executed. It finished 2023 around $600 million, up 40%. It did $749 million in 2024, up 48%. It went public on July 31, 2025 at $33 a share, a fully diluted valuation near $19 billion, which is almost exactly what Adobe had offered three years earlier. The stock opened at $85, closed day one at $115.50, and peaked at $124.63 on August 2, putting the company north of $60 billion.
Today Figma guides to $1.465 billion for 2026, growing 39%, with Q2 up 48% and net dollar retention at 136%. Revenue is up nearly fourfold from the deal. The market cap is roughly $14 billion.
Figma grew almost 4x and is worth less than the check Adobe was writing, even counting the $1 billion it collected for the privilege. The multiple went from 50x ARR to 8.2x. A six-fold compression swamped four years of very good execution.
That is the Slack question answered live, with a better company. Figma has every ingredient the Slack bull case requires, at 39% growth with 136% NDR, working AI credit monetization and accelerating quarters, and it carries the highest multiple in application software right now. It still trades below the 2022 offer.
And Field signed the same deal Butterfield did. Regulators tore his up. Four years later the two companies sit in roughly the same place. The re-rating moved their valuations more than any decision either founder made, and it is doing the same thing to yours.
